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Reassurance Policing in Practice: Views from the Shop Floor 
 
Abstract 
Recent years have seen falls in recorded crime in England and Wales, 
although the perception for many has remained that crime is rising. This has 
been dubbed the reassurance gap and is closely related to concerns over fear 
of crime and public confidence in the police. Reassurance policing (RP) is 
seen as a means to address this ‘gap’. But is RP simply community policing 
repackaged? Does it offer more than improved public relations? As a concept, 
RP has been evolving since the late-1990s and in October 2003 the Home 
Office funded National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP) was 
launched with pilot sites located in eight police force areas. Prior to this, RP 
was developed and trialled in two of these forces, and was closely informed 
by the signal crimes perspective under development by Innes and colleagues. 
The authors were involved in monitoring progress made by the two initial 
forces, and in assessing the readiness of the remaining six for participation in 
the NRPP. This paper draws on interviews and focus groups held with key 
stakeholders from both police and partnership agencies.  
 
 
Introduction 
 
Crime rates, as recorded by national counts and by the British Crime Survey 
(BCS), have been falling since the mid-1990s (Simmons and colleagues 
2002). However, there has been a lag in perception with many people 
believing that crime is on the increase (see Audit Commission, 1999). This 
gap in perception has been dubbed the reassurance gap (ACPO 2001a); in 
simple terms, if crime is going down, then the public need to be reassured that 
the police are doing their job. Concurrent to this has been concern that fear of 
crime is too high and public confidence in policing too low. Reassurance 
policing (RP) has been seen as a means to address these concerns. 
However, assumptions over high fear of crime may be misplaced in that some 
BCS measures - worry about burglary, car crime and violent crime – have 
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recently seen significant falls (Allen and Wood 2003; Christopherson et al., 
2004). Although the accuracy of fear of crime measures has been contested 
(e.g. Ditton et al., 2000; Irving, 2001) if anything, they are thought to over-
estimate the problem (see Farrall and Gadd, 2004). During 2003 BCS 
indicators of perceived disorder and anti-social behaviour also started to fall 
(Christopherson et al., 2004). The contention that public confidence in the 
police is declining finds support in BCS statistics (Mirrlees-Black, 2001), and 
in the work of other academics (FitzGerald et al. 2002; Hough 2003). 
 
The focus of RP was initially envisaged by HMIC as providing a more visible, 
familiar and accessible police force (Povey, 2001), and by ACPO as a move 
away from a police performance culture based on volume crime figures (see 
ACPO 2001a). However, since its inception there have been other versions of 
reassurance as a concept, and different interpretations of how it should be put 
into practice (see Millie and Herrington, 2005). This paper considers RP as it 
was applied in the National Reassurance Policing Programme (NRPP). This 
programme started with trial sites in two force areas, expanding to include 
projects in eight police forces in autumn 2003 – it was due to finish 31st March 
20051. The programme was closely linked to the signal crimes perspective 
under development by Martin Innes and colleagues (see e.g. Innes and 
Fielding, 2002). Our involvement in the NRPP was twofold: firstly in 
monitoring the progress made in the initial trial sites (Millie, 2003); and 
secondly in assessing the readiness of the six forces to join the programme 
from October 2003 (Millie et al., 2003).2 The authors worked closely with the 
Police Foundation throughout (e.g. Irving and Bourne, 2003). 
 
In this paper we consider what the NRPP approach entailed and why it 
emerged as a new form of policing at this particular time. We then consider 
the views from the shop floor; in other words those tasked with implementing 
the approach. Our focus is how RP was thought to differ from other forms of 
community-oriented policing already in existence in the project areas and how 
the approach fitted in with other policing demands. The paper draws on 
                                                 
1Some work will continue under the ‘Neighbourhood Policing Programme’ 
2
 This work was funded by the Association of Chief Police Officers 
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interviews and focus groups held with key stakeholders, involving 
approximately 140 people from both police and partnership agencies. The 
ongoing developmental nature of reassurance policing necessitates the 
caveat that our comments are based upon observations made during the 
early stages of the NRPP.  
 
Why now? 
Over the last seven years or so there has been a change in policing to a focus 
on volume crimes - such as domestic burglary and street crime - with 
success, or indeed otherwise, measured by Best Value Performance 
Indicators (BVPIs). There has been an emphasis on number counting, with 
community-oriented policing and lower level disorder/anti-social behaviour 
problems falling down the order of priority. It has been recognised that this 
‘modernization’ process may have done more harm than good to community 
relations and public confidence in policing (see Hough, 2003) and that the 
balance between a performance culture and community policing needed to be 
redressed (e.g. Fitzgerald et al., 2002; Povey, 2001). 
 
In line with this, more recently there has been increased awareness of lower-
level disorder, and the political agenda has been shifting with a greater 
emphasis put on tackling the new ‘evil’ - anti-social behaviour (as reflected in 
the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003). Calls for a visible policing presence 
within communities - to address so called ‘quality of life’ issues - have resulted 
in an extension of the policing family (e.g. the introduction of Police 
Community Support Officers - PCSOs). Whether such developments signal a 
genuine change of policing philosophy is a discussion for another paper. 
However, despite the rhetoric, the focus on police performance has not been 
removed, and BVPIs are still seen as all-important measures of force 
success.  
 
Whatever the reasons behind a renewed focus on ‘quality of life’ and 
community issues, this provided the background for the development of what 
has become known as reassurance policing. It also provided the opportunity 
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for Martin Innes and colleagues at the University of Surrey to trial their ‘signal 
crime perspective’.  
 
 
So what is RP? 
 
A cynic might argue that RP is nothing more than a public relations exercise, 
with the police presenting a more friendly face in an attempt to prove that they 
really care about their communities. The approach has already acquired the 
nicknames ‘there, there policing’ or ‘big hug policing’, and for many it has 
been interpreted as another attempt at community policing under a new 
name, rather than a new approach in itself. The potential problem was 
identified by Fitzgerald et al. who observed: 
 
If reassurance policing yields reductions in crime and disorder as well 
as reassurance, it is hard to see how it differs from effective policing. If 
it doesn’t yield these reductions, the case for it needs careful scrutiny. 
It is difficult to justify devoting limited police resources to policing 
activity that serves only to give people the impression they are safer 
from crime. (2002: 132). 
 
The model adopted by the NRPP had the dual focus of providing public 
reassurance and reducing crime and disorder. If this is nothing more than 
‘effective policing’, then this is at least a change in direction from a focus 
solely on volume crime. For the NRPP, reducing crime and disorder and 
increasing public reassurance were intrinsically linked, the aim being to 
identify the crimes or disorders for an area that act as key ‘signals’ 
detrimentally affecting the way the public view the area. The central tenants of 
this signal crimes perspective were: 
 
• That disorder and crime are functionally equivalent and of similar form, 
and are not causally linked; 
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• That particular acts of crime and social control disproportionately affect 
how individuals and communities experience and construct their beliefs 
about crime, disorder and control; and 
• Particular crime or disorder signals can be identified and countered by 
control signals. 
(See Innes, 2004; Innes and Fielding, 2002; Innes et al., 2002) 
 
Signal crimes draws from Sampson and Raudenbush’s work in Chicago on 
community efficacy (1999); other work on the Chicago Alternative Policing 
Strategy (e.g. Skogan and Hartnett, 1997); and criminological thinking going 
back to ‘broken windows’ (Wilson and Kelling, 1982) - along with their 
critiques (e.g. Harcourt, 2001). From the risk literature the main influence has 
been Slovik’s (1992) work on risk perception, which identifies different risks as 
having different signal values.3 
 
As applied by the NRPP, these ‘signals’ were identified through a range of 
techniques, including surveying residents and in-depth qualitative interviews. 
This evidence was set alongside the results of an environmental audit of the 
area in question – involving officers observing and recording signs which may 
prove to act as signals of crime, disorder or control. The aim was that, once 
the dominant signals were identified, resources would be focused on acting 
on these, thereby providing reassurance to the public that the police are 
listening to their concerns and acting on them. Whilst the NRPP anticipated 
that the main signals causing concern would be disorders or anti-social 
behaviour, the signal crimes perspective is clear that they could also be more 
serious crime – and in some areas may even be the same as the BVPIs. The 
key to the programme was that whichever signals were locally identified, 
these would be prioritised as much as is practicable. Dealing with these 
signals made the NRPP more ambitious than just providing a more visible 
police presence, which for many epitomises traditional community policing 
approaches (although, this may certainly be part of the suggested solution). 
 
                                                 
3
 For an explanation of the approach’s theoretical background see Innes and Fielding (2002). 
For the NRPP see www.reassurancepolicing.com  
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Is it just another version of existing community policing? 
So how does RP differ from other community-policing approaches? As 
outlined, the NRPP followed a signal crimes perspective with ‘the community’ 
identifying what key signals need to be focused upon. However, some may 
argue that this is what community-policing initiatives have been doing all 
along via existing consultation arrangements. As such there may be the 
temptation simply to re-badge pre-existing community projects. Indeed, most 
of the NRPP forces did have, or were planning to operate, other forms of 
community-oriented policing, such as: 
 
• Safer Neighbourhood Teams4 – the piloting and then roll out of dedicated 
community policing teams to each ward/neighbourhood (comprising one 
sergeant, two constables and three PCSOs) 
• Community Safety Action Zones5 – a partnership approach introduced in 
one of the London RP project areas 
• Township Policing – a geographic structure for policing introduced by 
Greater Manchester Police where officers have responsibility for particular 
areas 
• Geographic Policing – similar to Township Policing and introduced by 
Lancashire Constabulary 
• Micro-beat policing6 – an extension of the geographic model, where each 
officer is given responsibility for a sub-division of each beat – as 
introduced by West Midlands Police 
 
If we are looking to distinguish RP, we might view these approaches as 
providing structure to community policing; RP is able to work within these 
structures and provide a theoretically robust working methodology. 
Alternatively, implementing RP in areas where community-policing initiatives 
already exist may mean that officers assume they are adhering to a signal 
crimes model, but continue working within an established community policing 
style, or assume that they already know what the ‘signal’ crimes will be. There 
                                                 
4
 www.met.police.uk/saferneighbourhoods  
5
 www.bexley.gov.uk/service/bcsp/csaz.html  
6
 www.west-midlands.police.uk/recruitment/home_policing.htm  
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is scope for confusion over what initiatives are called and what approach is 
being taken.  
 
While these are concerns, we take the more optimistic view in that - by 
following the signal crimes methodology - RP does offer something new, 
albeit drawing on a theoretical and practical policing heritage. The NRPP has 
provided a timely framework for reassurance, as the phrase develops its 
buzz-word status. In the words of one officer; 
 
When you’ve got an emerging product as [we] have…it allows the 
framework that if you’re bumbling around thinking, ‘well what’s all this 
reassurance’…it provides some markers. (Sergeant) 
 
 
Views from the shop floor 
 
What did those tasked with the delivery of RP think about it as a concept? 
When we spoke to police officers who were - or would be - involved in the 
NRPP, it became apparent that they were most interested in how it would 
impact upon their work ‘on the shop floor’.  
 
Many police officers saw the approach as requiring them to be visible, familiar 
and accessible to communities. This is in line with the HMIC Open All Hours 
conception of reassurance (Povey, 2001). Most saw this as achievable 
through an expansion of the existing ‘community’ or ‘beat’ officer role, allowing 
beat officers to build community relationships without fear of being abstracted 
(e.g. to ‘man up’ under-strength response teams). As one constable observed, 
‘At least reassurance means that there will be one identifiable police officer for 
each area, which is what the community want. They want someone to turn 
to’7.  
 
                                                 
7
 See also Millie and Herrington (2005) 
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‘Walking the beat’ was thought to be an important part of reassurance, 
although most recognised that this was not enough in itself, and that they also 
needed to make an effort to have meaningful contact with communities and 
publicise their presence. In this sense it was seen as more than just a matter 
of having more police officers on the beat, although, inevitably some were of 
this view.  
 
RP was also seen to be the sharing of community problems, and working with 
partnership agencies to tackle these together. Many felt that RP provided the 
opportunity to formalise working relationships, and for others it gave the 
opportunity to kick start some of the more challenging interactions and add a 
bit of ‘clout’ to requests to, for example, clean up graffiti or improve street 
lighting.  
 
As an extension of this, there was a belief among officers that the police, and 
their partners, needed to consult communities - in line with the underlying 
premise of the signal crimes perspective. This was often thought to be easier 
said than done, with some officers that we spoke to noting that failures by the 
police to listen in the past meant that ‘barriers’ had gone up in some 
communities, and that more than a list of promises would be needed to regain 
that trust.  
 
The final component was thought to be the advertising of crime fighting 
successes, so that the local community could see what their real risk was and 
hopefully would not be so fearful. Again, this was easier said and done, and 
local press were often said to exaggerate and sensationalise local criminality. 
A balance needed to be struck, and the importance of having the media on 
side was a lesson learnt - and indeed acted upon - as the project was rolled-
out and media strategies became part of project management plans for many 
sites.  
 
In addition to these procedural aspects of the RP approach, many officers 
described the overall ethos as making quality of life issues a policing concern, 
and encouraging them to pay attention to incivilities. One constable saw his 
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role prior to the NRPP as follows: ‘Whereas before, from a police perspective 
you might see rubbish on the footpath and graffiti, and you didn’t consider it 
part of your remit – you are concerned with dealing with crime and responding 
to calls’. Similarly another constable interviewed saw reassurance policing as 
‘a move away from fire-brigade policing’. Officers also saw reassurance as a 
route to improve community confidence and cooperation with the police, and 
ultimately impacting upon levels of criminal behaviour. 
 
Issues applying RP 
 
Despite the enthusiastic response we encountered from many we spoke to, a 
number of issues were raised about how reassurance fitted into day-to-day 
policing, and what problems there might be when trying to apply the concept.  
 
First and foremost there were concerns that until this type of policing became 
a priority, activities that were counted through BVPIs would continue to take 
primacy - we were often told that ‘what gets counted gets done’: 
 
Everything’s been geared towards crime. That’s the way we’re driven, 
toward dealing with crime rather than social disorder and youth causing 
annoyance or juvenile nuisance, whatever you would like to call it. We 
seem to get driven really from government…and them saying ‘what are 
you doing about robbery, what are you doing about this?’ (Inspector) 
 
A related concern voiced by officers was the ability to ring-fence the time of 
reassurance officers. The experience of the trial sites in particular highlighted 
that competing demands on divisional resources often led to officer 
abstractions, with those tasked to reassurance diverted to sure-up response 
teams, or for aid or duties in other areas of the force. There was a recognised 
need that time should be ring-fenced as much as practicably possible. Without 
this communities could not have the consistency they needed, and officers 
would have difficulty engaging with local people and gaining their trust. Where 
effective ring-fencing was in place, the benefits were noted. For example; 
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Because [name of officer] is a [dedicated reassurance officer] she can’t 
be abstracted. If she wasn’t here the community would only have me 
for approximately eight hours every other week, and the council would 
have the hump because of all the abstractions. I thinks the residents of 
the ward are doing quite well out of it. We can develop better 
partnerships because [the dedicated reassurance officer] is available 
during normal office hours and can make meetings etc. I think that the 
volume of work the police do has made us unreliable – we’ve bitten off 
more than we can chew. (Constable) 
 
The idea of ring-fencing was seen to extend to a commitment by officers in 
reassurance roles to stay in post long enough to allow things to at least get up 
and running; a concern often exacerbated by the frequency of staff turnover. 
That said, the developmental nature of the project meant that some 
compromises had to be made at the early stages due to resource pressures: 
 
One of the primary concerns was to get good quality officers on 
board…and the problem of having officers with certain types of skills is 
that there is great demand on their time. …It doesn’t sound like a lot, 
but to ring-fence eight officers for our borough, when you look at the 
overall staffing profile, is a big, big commitment. So what we do is ring-
fence them for anything but duties that actually require their [extra] 
skills. Unfortunately with the sort of skills [they have] that is quite often. 
(Chief Inspector) 
 
Other projects in the NRPP were more successful in maintaining dedicated 
reassurance officers. Additionally, many of those interviewed thought that 
PCSOs were a valuable resource to RP, providing a further visible community 
contact. Nonetheless, this was only if they were properly trained, willing to 
take on a proactive community liaison role, and were dedicated to the area 
concerned.  
 
Selling the concept to response teams 
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There was recognition that the concept also needed to be sold to response 
teams, and that it should be an integral part of all policing, rather than just the 
concern of reassurance officers and/or PCSOs. However, many officers felt 
that the workload of response team officers, coupled with apathy towards 
community-focused policing by many, meant that reassurance was regarded 
as nothing to do with them: 
 
On [response teams] you are tied to the radio and never get time to do 
things properly. You’re judged on every measurable part of your day, 
from stops, to arrests, to response times – so you’re very busy. Most 
[response officers] are more interested in completing their shift and 
going home in one piece. Reassurance is not very relevant to them. 
They’re policing’s quick fix to an immediate problem. The two are 
linked, but they are not necessarily relevant to each other. (Constable) 
 
Many officers we spoke to were aware that a lot of good work could be 
undone by casual remarks - about the crime rate for example - made by 
response officers attending calls. As such, it was felt that reassurance needed 
to be a ‘golden thread’ running through all aspects of policing, rather than 
being a bolt on extra that was the concern of a small number of officers (see 
Millie and Herrington, 2005). As one officer said: 
 
When [response officers] go and deliver their response function, if you 
haven’t got officers delivering reassurance in that silo too, then 
potentially they can go and destroy many hours and many days of 
really good work – just by an inappropriate response. (Chief Inspector) 
 
As part of the NRPP, ‘reassurance’ was later incorporated into the divisional 
Tasking and Coordination meetings – which direct local police resource 
allocation as part of the National Intelligence Model. This hopefully raised its 
profile among non-reassurance officers. 
 
Having a clear identity 
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In line with our earlier observations, some officers thought there needed to a 
clear and consistent identity for the project, which would allow police, partners 
and communities to understand - and be able to engage with – what is going 
on. In one of the sites a constable observed; ‘One of the major problems right 
from the outset was, when the reassurance project was announced, it was 
also called [x] and [y]. That was three names in about a week, and it all got 
very confusing’.  Without this distinction, RP and community policing were at 
risk of being confused – with the potential that even those delivering the 
programme would become unable to tell where traditional community policing 
stopped and RP began. For example, 
 
I’m a beat manager…which is not technically part of reassurance [in 
our area]. I have my beat and I look after it. Then you’ve got [dedicated 
reassurance officers]. They get the whole beat and they are able to get 
funding for certain things. The way I see it is that we all do the same 
job, we’ve just got different names, we do the same stuff. (Constable) 
 
 
Discussion 
 
From our interviews and observations it became clear that RP was thought - 
by those involved in the NRPP - to be capable of achieving a whole range of 
objectives, including: 
 
• To reduce fear of crime  
• To increase public confidence in the police 
• To increase community efficacy 
• To improve intelligence gathering  
• To reduce crime 
• To reduce anti-social behaviour 
• To provide structure to community policing 
• To improve the local environment – both physical and social 
• To provide legitimacy to local policing decisions 
• To facilitate consensus policing 
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As we have noted elsewhere (Millie and Herrington, 2005: 53) these are 
ambitious concepts. From this list we believe the approach provides a good 
opportunity to first improve confidence in the police and provide legitimacy to 
local policing decisions. Once these two principles are in place, then the other 
objectives become increasingly possible – and likely. Utilising a signal crimes 
perspective to identify and tackle the issues that are of local concern, the 
NRPP permitted the public to have a direct input in defining local policing 
priorities (Innes, 2004), which should then increase confidence in policing and 
policing decisions. However, in order to succeed the approach needs to stay 
true to the theoretical underpinnings that make it distinct from wider 
community policing. Without this, reassurance policing - as articulated through 
the NRPP - could quite easily be swept up with other community policing 
approaches. Recent emphasis on ‘neighbourhood policing’, as shown in the 
Police Reform White Paper (HMSO, 2004), perhaps makes this even more 
likely.  
 
Reassurance policing is about tackling the specific issues that cause 
communities concern, but we often heard officers comment that they already 
knew what these problems were, and what the public would want done. 
Indeed they might be right, but if these assumptions become the basis upon 
which issues are tackled - rather than adhering to the signal crimes 
methodology - then reassurance is likely to become a low-level disorder or 
anti-social behaviour focused initiative. This may have value, but it is likely to 
have less of an impact on confidence and legitimacy.   
 
For RP to be taken seriously by all policing, then problems of ring-fencing and 
the approach’s apparent conflict with BVPI policing needs to be resolved. If 
RP is to prove its worth beyond the life of the NRPP, it is essential that the 
‘reassurance’ and ‘signal crimes’ labels do not just become validation bolt-ons 
to community – or neighbourhood – policing in general, and those involved 
pay heed to the philosophy of the approach. 
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